ፓለቲካዊ መግባባት እና የፓልቶክ ታዳሚዎች (PDF)- ያዬ አበበ

http://www.ethiomedia.com/13report/survey_among_paltalk_users.pdf

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የብሔራዊ ዕርቅ ጥያቄና ፈተናዎቹ በኢትዮጵያ (ክፍል 1) - በዳዊት ተሾመ

ከደርግ የ17 አመታት የአገዛዝ ውደቀት በኋላ በኢትዮጵያ የፖለቲካ ኃይሎች በስፋት ሲንጸባረቁ ከነበሩ ጥያቄዎች መካከል የብሔራዊ ዕርቅ ጥያቄ ዋነኛው ነው::

በዚህ ወቅት ውስጥ ለብሔራዊ ዕርቅ ጥያቄ በፖለቲካ ኃይሎች የቀረቡት የመፍትሔ ሃሳቦች የተለያዩ ቢሆንም የመፍትሔ ሃሳቦቹ የሚመነጩት ግን በዋናነት ከሁለት ተገዳዳሪ አስተሳሰቦች ነው:: አንደኛው አስተሳሰብ የሚያጠነጥነው የብሔራዊ ዕርቅ ጥያቄው የሚካትተው ከኢትዮጵያ ዘመናዊ የሃገር ግንባታ ጋር ተያይዞ የተፈፀሙ ታሪካዊ ኢ-ፍትሃዊነትንና በደሎችን እንዲሁም በያ ትውልድ ውስጥ የተፈፀሙ መጠፋፋትን አካቶ ሁሉን-አካታች መድረክ በማዘጋጀት ያለፈውን በደሎች ዕውቅና በመስጠት በፖለቲካ ሊህቃን መካከል መግባባትን ማስፈንን ነው:: ሁለተኛው አስተሳሰብ የብሔራዊ ዕርቅ ጥያቄን የሚመለከተው ኢትዮጵያን እንደ ሀገር በአዲስ መሰረት ላይ የመገንባት ሂደት አድርጎ ነው:: ይህም ማለት የብሔራዊ ዕርቅ ጥያቄ የሚያቅፈው ሁሉንም አይነት ማለትም ብሔር፣ ሃይማኖት እንዲሁም መደብ ላይ መሰረት ያደረገ ኢ-ፍትሃዊነትና መገለልን ከኢትዮጵያ ዘመናዊ የሃገር ግንባታ ጀምሮ የኢህአዴግን የአገዛዝንም የሚያካትት ነው። ተጨማሪ ያንብቡ

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በህወሃት ውስጥ የዕርቅ ሃሳብ መነሳቱ ተሰማ - ጎልጉል

በህወሃት ውስጥ የዕርቅ ሃሳብ መነሳቱ ተሰማ

"የኢህአዴግ የአፈና ገመድ ነትቧል፣ ድርጅቱ ተናግቷል"

ኢትዮጵያ ግራ በሚያጋባና ሊተነበይ በማይችል የፖለቲካ ቀውስ ውስጥ መገኘቷን ያመኑ የህወሃት ሰዎች መካካል የእርቅ ሃሳብ ላይ ለማተኮር እቅድ እንዲያዝ ሃሳብ ማንሳታቸው ተሰማ። ኢህአዴግ የቀድሞው የአፈና ገመዱ መንተቡን የሚያሳዩ ምልክቶች መታየታቸውና አለመተማመን መንገሱ ተጠቆመ።

ለጎልጉል መረጃ በመስጠት የሚታወቁ የኢህአዴግ ከፍተኛ አመራርና ዲፕሎማት እንዳሉት ህወሃት ውስጥ “እርቅ አስፈላጊ ነው” በሚል እቅድ እንዲያዝና እንዲሰራበት ሃሳብ ቀርቧል። በድርጅቱ ውስጥ በተፈጠረ አለመተማመን ሳቢያ ስጋት የገባቸው የህወሃት ሰዎች የእርቅ ሃሳብ እንዲሰራበት ያቀረቡት ሃሳብ ግን በመደበኛ ስብሰባ አይደለም። ተጨማሪ ያንብቡ

ምንጭ፦ http://www.goolgule.com/tplf-in-search-of-reconciliation/

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የብሄራዊ እርቅ ጊዜ አሁን ነው (PDF) - ገለታው ዘለቀ

ባለፉት ጥቂት ተከታታይ ጽሁፎች ላይ እንደተወያየነው በስምምነት ላይ የተመሰረተ ባህላዊ ውህደት ውስጥ መግባት ኢትዮጵያን እንደገና ለማነጽ ኣማራጭ መፍትሄ ይሆናል። ታዲያ በስምምነት ላይ የተመሰረተ ባህላዊ ውህደት ላሉብን ውስብስብ ሁለንተናዊ
ችግሮች ሁሉ መፍትሄ ይሆናል ማለት ሳይሆን ቅድሚያ ተሰጥቷቸው ሊፈቱ የሚገባቸውን ባህላዊ ማህበራዊ ችግሮች መስመር በማስያዝ በሂደት እየተፈቱ እንዲሄዱ ከማድረጉም በላይ ሌሎች ችግሮችን ለመፍታት ደግሞ ቀጥተኛ ያልሆነ ኣስተዋጾ ስላለው
ነው። በችግር ኣፈታት ጊዜ ከሚመጡት መፍትሄዎች መካከል የትኛውን ብናስቀድም ነው ሌላውን ችግርም ኣብሮ ሊፈታልን የሚችለው ብለንም እንጠይቃለንና በዚህ ረገድ በስምምነት ላይ የተመሰረተ ባህላዊ ውህደት ውስጥ መግባት ሌሎች መጋቢና
ተለጣጣቂ ችግሮችን ለመፍታት ይጠቅማል ከሚል ነው። ተጨማሪ ያንብቡ

ምንጭ፦ http://www.ethiomedia.com/14store/bherawi_erq.pdf

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Ethiopia: The 65 Percent and Political Consensus - Yaye Abebe

Ethiopia’s population is predominantly young. This is according to the United States Central Intelligence Agency July 2013 estimate of Ethiopia’s population: 0-14 years olds are 44.4% of population, while the 15-24 age group is 19.9% of the population.

The sum of the under 24 year old demographics is 65% of Ethiopia’s population, which amounts to more than 60 million people. (The 44.4% is more than 41 million, the 19.9% a little under 20 million).

Our country’s young population is coming of age within a decade, but is our nation’s politics ready for such huge demographic shift? What are the political challenges that we need to address to create a conducive political culture for our youth to live in a peaceful, stable and prosperous Ethiopia?

The 65% Factor

A young population has a great potential for economic, social and spiritual growth, but it is only a potential. Like all other untapped resources, if our young population is not understood, managed and utilized ethically and morally, the danger for misuse and mismanagement is immense.

In the past 40 years our nation has gone through incalculable suffering in all layers of our shared reality. Most tragedies, in my humble opinion, could have been averted given the right state of mind, preparation and leadership.

The 65% factor is a responsibility, for those of us who anticipate a tsunami of a major demographic shift in the horizon, to take a proactive and influential role in paving a new path of constructive political culture.

The 65% Opportunity

The 2012 US re-election of President Barack Obama is mainly attributed to the demographic shift in the American political landscape. It was a major shift but the Republicans either didn’t anticipate it or felt deluded in their desire to ‘take back’ America. The demographic shifts of the Arab world are also, to a large extent, credited for the emergence of Arab Spring (Hoffman, 2012).

Ethiopia will also, in the next decade, have a major part of its adult population dominated by young adults, the 20 to 30 age group, resulting in a major demographic shift. Psychologists stress the crucial importance of the formative years of a young person on self perception, worldview and major life decisions (Lerner).

It is this psychological reality that makes me believe the 1960s Ethiopian youth experienced a political upheaval that stunted and deformed its potential for the emergence of a new, normalized political discourse in Ethiopia. The 60s generation went through the traumatic experience of the Red Terror and other political conflicts which have contributed deeply to its self-preservative, vegetative state of continually concocting political strategies and tactics with major militant undercurrent.

After having learned from their traumatic experience, my father’s generation, who, by the way, was political prisoner of the Derg for 8 years, needs to wake up and realize that its political culture should not be inherited by the 65% for the very fact that the 60s political culture is a culture deformed by traumatic political violence and the absence of a fall back culture of political consensus.

Now, the 65% young population is the sole opportunity for the Student Movement generation and my post-revolution generation to realize that we can neither follow the lose-lose path of civil war nor the gamblers road to popular uprising. Both paths have resulted in self-inflicted, four decades long, dysfunctional and futile political culture.

The 65% Path

The 60 million Ethiopians, under the age of 24, need to see a role model to follow on how to resolve political differences, tensions and crisis. If those of us who are propagating the lose-lose path of civil war have our way, the 65% will learn hostility, violence and war.

On the other hand, if those of us salivating for a Libyan, Egyptian or even Syrian type of uprising get our way, we will be gambling with the potential of the 65%. And unless we are willingly forgetting what has happened in the abovementioned nations, we should also remember our own nation’s 1974 uprising and the catastrophic outcome. Revolution is a gamble.

The need for a paradigm shift in our violence-or-gambling mode of political thinking is the very reason I decided to advocate for the 65% Ethiopians. As a nation we are at a point where we must grow up and mature; we must abandon the politics of trauma and the failed violence-or-gambling paths and turn our focus towards exploring the underutilized and ignored path of initiating dialogue among the ruling party and legal opposition parties to create a much needed political consensus in Ethiopia.

Political Consensus

After having talked to 18 Ethiopians in Paltalk political discussion forums, both pro and against the ruling party, I have realized that the idea of political consensus (Poletikawi Megbabat) is under-explored and under-developed within our community's context.

The 65% need to witness political consensus in action in Ethiopia for the very fundamental purpose of shaping and building a constructive political culture during their formative and young-adult years.

Here is what I am proposing: The exploration and development of the idea of political consensus, on both conceptual and practical levels, to normalize the political discourse in Ethiopia. If you believe in this path, please let us raise awareness about the need for political consensus by exploring, writing, speaking, and advocating about political consensus as the superior solution for our nation’s political predicament.

--
The writer, Yaye Abebe, can be reached at yayeabebe@gmail.com

- Lerner, Jacqueline V. (2001). Adolesscence in America : an encyclopedia. Santa Barbara, Calif.: ABC-CLIO. p. 577

- CIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/llibrary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/et.html, accessed on October 11, 2013

- (Amharic only) Abebe, Yaye (2013). Pooletikawi Megbabat Ena 18 Ye Paltalk Tadamiwoch – Tiyaqena Mels, http://www.ethiomedia.com/13report/survey_among_paltalk_users.pdf, accessed on October 15, 2013

- Hoffman, Michael (2012). The Youth and thhe Arab Spring: Cohort Differences and Similarities Princeton University, accessed on October 16, 2013 

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የእርቅ ማኒፌስቶ፦ ወደ ዲሞክራሲ የሚያደርስ አማራጭ መንገድ (ዶ/ር ዘለዓለም እሸቴ ይመር)

ያለፉት 23 አመታት በመንግስትና ተቃዋሚ መካከል ያለው ቅራኔ መፍትኤ አላመጣም። በጦርነት ስልጣን የያዘ መንግስት ዲሞክራሲ ይኸሁላችው ብሎ ይሰጥ ዘንድ አይቻለውም። በጦርነት መንግስት ለመቀየር የሚታገለውም ስልጣኑን ሲይዝ ከዚህ የተለየ አያደርግም። ኢትዮጵያ መውጫ ቀዳዳ ያጣች ትመስላለች። እሺ ብንል እርቅና መግባባት ዲሞክራሲን ለመውለድ ብቸኛ መንገድ ነው። እንዴት ማለት ጥሩ ነው። ሁላችንም የምንጠለልባት፦ በፍቅር ተሳስረን የምንኖርባትን ቤተ ኢትዮጵያን እንዴት እንገንባት?

1ኛ/ ሰላምን ብቻ መምረጥ ላይ መድረስ፦ የቤተ ኢትዮጵያ መሰረት።

የስላሙን ትግል ከትግሎች ውስጥ እንደ አንዱ ሳይሆን እንደ ብቸኛ አማራጭ መውሰድ ይገባል። ኢትዮጵያ ለዚህ አይነት ሰላም ራሳቸውን የሰጡ ሰላማዊ ተቃዋሚ ልጆች አላት። ሰላምን ብቻ መምረጥ ወደ ዲሞክራሲ የሚያደርሰው የእርቅና መግባባት አስተሳሰብ መሰረት ነው። ያለዚህ የመጀመሪያ እርምጃ ንቅንቅ ማለት አይቻልም። በሌላው በኩል ይህ ብቻ በራሱ ዋጋ የለውም። በዚህ መሰረት ላይ መሰራት ያለበት ምሶሶ ያስፈልጋል። ያም ምሶሶ መተማመን ነው።

2ኛ/ መተማመን ላይ መድረስ፦ የቤተ ኢትዮጵያ ምሶሶ።

መንግስት ለሰላም ትግል ነፃነት ሰጥቻለሁ ማለት ብቻ በራሱ ዋጋ የለውም። ተቃዋሚ የሰላም ትግል አካሄዳለው ማለቱ ብቻ በራሱ ትርጉም የለውም። መተማመን ላይ እስካልተደረሰ ድረስ ሁለቱም ውጤት አያመጡም። ለመተማመን ደግሞ ቃል በስራ መተርጎም አለበት። ለምሳሌ መንግስት የሕዝብን ሚዲያዎች በሙሉ ለራሱ መገልገያ ማዋል ብቻ ሳይሆን ለሰላማዊ ተቃዋሚ መድረኩን መክፈት ይጠበቅበታል። ያለበለዚያ እግርን ጥፍር አድርጎ አስሮ ሲያበቃ ለመሮጥ ነፃነት ሰጥቻለሁ እንደማለት ይቆጠራል። በሌላ በኩል ደግሞ ተቃዋሚው የሰላም ትግልን ከመረጠ የመንግስት ተቃዋሚ ብቻ ሳይሆን የትጥቅ ትግል የመረጡትንም ጭምር መቃወም ይጠበቅበታል። ያለበለዚያ በሁለት ቢላዋ ለመብላት እንደ መሞከር ይቆጠራል።

3ኛ/ መደማመጥ ላይ መድረስ፦ የቤተ ኢትዮጵያ ግድግዳ።

መተማመን ከተጀመረ መደማመጥ መከተል ያስፈልገዋል። ያለበለዚያ ምሶሶ ብቻ ታቅፎ ቤት አለን አይባልም። አንዱ ሌላኛውን ከጨዋታ አውጥቶ ሙሉ በሙሉ መቆጣጠር ከመፈለግ ይልቅ በእርቅና በመግባባት የኢትዮጵያን ችግር አብሮ ለመቅረፍ መጣር ያስፈልጋል። ሰላማዊ ተቃዋሚ መሆን ጥቅሙ በጉልህ ይታይ። መንግስት ከሰላማዊው ተቃዋሚ ጋር በመጎራበት ሲሰራ ያየ ሁሉ የትጥቅ ትግል ጊዜ ያለፈበት ያረጀና ያከተመለት መሆኑን በሚገባ ይረዳል። ቤተ ኢትዮጵያም መልክ እየያዘ ይመጣል። ግን ጉዞው ገና ነው። ቤቱ መጠለያ ለመሆን ጣሪያ ያስፈልገዋል።

4ኛ/ ዲሞክራሲን ማዳበር ላይ መድረስ፦ የቤተ ኢትዮጵያ ጣሪያ።

ምሶሶና ግድግዳ ሳይቆም ጣሪያ መስራት እንደማይቻል ሁሉ፤ ዲሞክራሲን ለማዳበር ከዚህ በፊት የተዘረዘሩትን ከቁም ነገር ማስገባትና በስራ መተግበር ያስፈልጋል። መንግስትና ሰላማዊ ተቃዋሚዎች በመጎራበት ሲሰሩ፦ መንግስትና የትጥቅ ታጋዮች ጡንቻቸውን መጠቀም ሲተው ያኔ ዲሞክራሲ ለማደግ ፋታ ያገኛል። ይህ አማራጭ መንገድ የኛው በኛው ለኛው የሆነ የእርቅና መግባባት ስሌት ነው። ከሌላ ኮርጀን የምናመጣው አይደለም። እንግዲህ መንግስትና ተቃዋሚ አንዱ ያለሌላኛው ለኢትዮጵያ ዜሮ መሆኑን ይረዳ። መንግስትም ንቀቱን ይተው። ተቃዋሚም ጥላቻውን ይተው። ሁለቱም በእርቅና በመግባባት የኢትዮጵያን ውስብስብ ችግር ዲሞክራሲን በማዳበር ለመፍታት ይጣሩ። አዲስ አቅጣጫ ያስፈልገናል። ያለበለዚያ ያንኑ ያረጀ አካሄድ ይዘን አዲስ ምዕራፍ መሻገር አይቻልም። ኢትዮጵያ እንዲታደጓት የምትጠራው ሁለቱም ጎራ ውስጥ ያሉትን ልጆቿን ነው። የእናት ኢትዮጵያን ድምፅ የሚሰማ ይታጣ?

እባክዎን ስለ ብሔራዊ እርቅና መግባባት የተዘጋጀውን የሃሳብ ዳሰሳ (survey)፤ ለዚሁ አገልግሎት ወደ ተዘጋጀው ድህረ ገፅ በመሄድ ድምፅዎን ያሰሙ (እዚህ ላይ ይጫኑ)። ለሌሎችም ይሞሉ ዘንድ ያሳስቡ። አዲሱ አመት የእርቅና የመግባባት ዘመን ይሁንልን። የኢትዮጵያ ጉዳይ ግራ የገባው ሁሉ እጁን ወደ እግዚአብሔር ይዘርጋ፦ ብቻውን ተአምራትን የሚያደርግ እርሱ ፈጣሪያችን ኢትዮጵያን ይታደጋት!አይዞን እግዚአብሔር አለ።

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“አገራችንን በእርቅ እንታደጋት” - ዶ/ር ተጋ ለንዳዶ

ዶ/ር ተጋ ለንዳዶ

የኢህአዴግ ባለስልጣኖችና ደጋፊዎች ከየትኛውም ዜጋ በላይ ዋስትና እንደሚፈልጉ በመግለጽ ዶ/ር ተጋ ለንዳዶ ለጎልጉል፡ የድረገጽ ጋዜጣ ተናገሩ። በአገራቸው ጉዳይ ላይ በተለይም በዕርቅ ዙሪያ በርካታ ጽሁፎችን ሲያቀርቡና ሲንቀሳቀሱ የቆዩት ዶ/ር ተጋ ለንዳዶ በኢትዮጵያ የአካባቢ ጥበቃ ዙሪያ በኃላፊነት ሲሰሩ የቆዩ ሲሆን ከአገራቸው ውጪም በኬንያ፣ በሞዛምቢክ፣ በስዊትዘርላንድና በተለያዩ የአሜሪካ ግዛቶች በከፍተና ኃላፊነት ሲሰሩ ቆይተዋል፡፡

 በተለይም በዎርልድ ቪዥን፣ በተባበሩት መንግሥታ፣ በዓለምአቀፍ አብያተክርስቲያናት ካውንስል፣ … የሰጡት የዓመታት አገልግሎት ተጠቃሽ ነው፡፡ በአገር ውስጥና በውጪ አገራት የተለያዩ ዩኒቨርሲቲዎች ከፍተኛ ትምህርታቸውን የተከታተሉት ዶ/ር ተጋ በደቡብ አፍሪካ በተካሄደው የዕርቅ፣ የሰላምና የፍትሕ ሒደት ውስጥ የተጫወቱት መጠነኛ ሚና በአገራቸው ተግባራዊ ሆኖ ለማየት የሚመኙና ለዚያም የሚቻላቸውን ጥረት ሁሉ ሲያደርጉ መቆየታቸው እስካሁን የሠሩት ሥራ ምስክር ነው፡፡ ከዚህም ሌላ ዶ/ር ተጋ ለንዳዶ የአገር ውስጥና የውጭ ስድስት ቋንቋዎችን አቀላጥፈው የሚናገሩ ናቸው፡፡ ተጨማሪ ያንብቡ


ምንጭ፦ http://www.goolgule.com/reconciliation-the-way-out/

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Inclusive Discourse: A Prelude to National Reconciliation - By Teklu Abate, PhD

Teklu Abate, PhD

To ensure the rule of law, freedom, and democratic governance in Ethiopia, the opposition mainly use two modes of struggle. What appears to be the dominant modus operandi is peaceful struggle, to which all the political parties operating in Ethiopia are required to subscribe. Armed struggle is preferred by other opposition parties/groups, whose scale of operation seems unclear to date. A limited number of groups claim to be eclectic in their approaches, vowing to use any means available to bring genuine change. The government of Ethiopia dubbed those groups that use the last two approaches as “terrorists” and hence, their physical presence is limited to the jungles and foreign capitals.

The relative effectiveness of each approach could not for sure be objectively judged. Nor is their extent of embrace by the Ethiopian people clear. Generally, one could argue that none of the approaches is effective in ushering real change. Two decades lapsed without any measurable change in the political milieu. Causes and reasons for the failure could of course transcend the boundaries of opposition parties; the ruling party, the Ethiopian people (both the Diaspora and those at home), and international pressures and maneuverings could be held accountable. In my previous paper entitled “Who retards political change in Ethiopia?” (available at http://tekluabate.blogspot.no/2012/11/who-retards-political-change-in-ethiopia.html), I tried to explain how and to what extent each entity unfavorably affected politics in Ethiopia during the last two decades.


One thing needs to be made clear. That the opposition are so far ineffective not simply because of the nature of the methods they used but mainly because of the extent of their (peaceful and armed) struggles. Struggles were not in match with the level of injustices made by the ruling party. Considering this state of affairs, we could not be able to see any meaningful changes in the times to come. And we are not going to see meaningful changes from the government either. The best one could do to avoid this ugly scenario might be to think what appears to be the unthinkable: to bring the polarized views of the government and the opposition to open, genuine, and rigorous self-scrutiny.
In this paper, it is argued that inclusive discourse, a systematic and sustained discussion of varying and contrasting ideologies, values, and/or opinions, could be entrusted to initiate, bring, and sustain real change in the way Ethiopia is being governed. This with a final goal of compromise, mutual understanding and then reconciliation. Although it is not new at the global level, it seems untried within the Ethiopian context. All the political changes that took place hitherto were either brought about by armed struggle (e.g. the collapse of the military rule), or by popular revolt (e.g. the demise of the imperial rule). Compared to other tried and tired approaches of the government and that of the opposition, inclusive discourse seems much more appealing to bring future peace and cohesion.

Discourse vs other approaches

Although one could use either peaceful or armed approach to bring change this time around, too, systematic, discourse-driven struggle is presumably far better or more effective for various reasons. One, discourse brings together contrasting views and encourages participants to finally make compromises. This would serve the interests of all parties and hence it liberates both the oppressed and the oppressors. Two, because oppressors will be equally liberated, they take part in nation re-building. Three, the possibility of future conflict and war could be none or little as all would consider the new system their own craft. Four, discourse damages neither human lives nor infrastructure. Five, because discourse formation has national, international, and global acceptance, the possibility of getting immense support in the process seems very high. Six, because of these five and other advantages, discourse could result in enhanced and sustained socio-economic and political transformations that could benefit all Ethiopians.

Stakeholders

Who will take part in discourse formation? One could be tempted to mention the government and opposition parties. I argue that all the contours of Ethiopian society should be adequately and fairly represented during the process. It is only this way that one could establish a system accepted by all all the times. We witness that trusting elites only to bring change does not work. To me, meaningful discourse should be conducted by the following entities.

• The government and the ruling party (although they are one and the same in Ethiopia)
• Opposition parties (at home and in the Diaspora that use peaceful as well as armed approaches)
• Representatives of all religions
• The youth
• NGOs
• Professional associations
• The Diaspora
• The media (both print and electronic as well as online)
• The intellectuals
• The elderly, and
• All political prisoners

Moreover, regional and international organizations (e.g. the AU, the EU), foreign governments, and donors could be invited to witness and support the process.

The next logical question could be: who would coordinate the process? To me, both the government and opposition parties should not be the facilitators, as they are the major rivals in the political scene. A sort of an ad hoc committee membering noted and respected Ethiopians could be entrusted to lead the process. In a way, the committee could identify a) a complete list of participants, b) topics and methods for discussion, c) rules of conduct, and, d) expected outputs and outcomes. Their draft could be presented to all interested people for feedback and improvement. Because of the complex nature of the job, committee members should be self-less; mature emotionally, morally, and intellectually; free from past or present involvement in injustices of any sorts, and well-connected locally and globally. However, for members who would come from the peasantry and rural parts of Ethiopia, a different set of criteria (e.g. experience in traditional arbitration) could be used. As a group, the committee should be as agile, ambitious and perseverant as possible.

Approaches

There is no a single effective approach to the conduct of discourse. Depending on contextual factors and conditions, specific steps and trajectories could be identified and employed. To me, it could help to consider two stages of discourse. First, stakeholders could debate on a whole array of socio-economic, cultural, and political issues. Stakeholders at this stage are likely to 1) assume that only their position is correct, 2) come to the discourse only to win, 3) be defensive, 4) try to prove the other party wrong, 5) engage in finding flaws in the other party, and 6) generally critique their competing partner. This should be expected and tolerated and the committee should have strategies to prevent communication breakdown.

After sometime and using different techniques, it is crucial to advance to the next higher level of discourse- to make dialogues. At this stage, participants should a) assume that each party has his own version of life and living in Ethiopia, b) listen to understand, c) be ready to explore common grounds amidst differences, d) evaluate their own and others’ positions and weigh their national versus party/group significance. The process is expected to urge stakeholders to make
compromises. These would in the end lead to common understanding and then reconciliation at the national level.

Both print and electronic as well as online media could play a central role at debate and dialogue levels. Media, for instance, could invite people to participate in panel discussions on carefully chosen topics. They could also initiate and coordinate online discussions, by inviting writers/speakers from the opposition as well as the government sides. It could be vital to garner huge participation from Ethiopians living in different parts of the world. Following serious and series of discussions on a given thematic area, patterns and trends could be identified. As an example, the first round of discussions could focus on the relevance and significance of this line of struggle and if deemed important, how to proceed ahead. The selection of committee members and specific topics/issues for discourse could only follow this. Obviously, the process is going to be a hard ride.

Challenges

As solving grand national problems through discourse is almost non-customary to Ethiopian politics, trying to initiate one could face a multitude of challenges. Identifying possible sources of challenges is the first step to devise coping mechanisms. The following could be considered the major ones.

• The government might claim that it is already doing great job to the Ethiopian people (citing its statistics) and hence might not acknowledge the need for discourse
• The government might consider the effort as an ‘underground’ movement that aims to salvage the opposition by creating shortcuts to power
• The opposition might not have the readiness and interest to enter into discourse on account that the government does not understand this sort of language
• And/or the opposition, particularly those that take armed trajectory, might consider this proposal as a calculated covert move by pro-government entities to ‘soften’ opposition movement
• It might be a particular challenge to identify able and ready people who would facilitate/coordinate the process
• The general public might not take the issue seriously and might develop conspiracy theories to ‘explain’ it
• Some countries and groups that do not want to see strong Ethiopia might put hurdles on the way

Final remarks

The type of discourse described above emanates from the fundamental assumption that the general public is frustrated by the way the government and the opposition are doing politics. Each holding its own discourse behind closed doors as if they are talking about different countries. And hence inclusive discourse is proposed to be an alternative to bring change to politics in Ethiopia. Or, it could be used by parties and groups who already got their own mode of operation.

If systematically planned and conducted, inclusive discourse could bring sizable results. The least one could expect from this endeavor is leaving behind the idea and significance of holding arguments with people of diverse viewpoints and opinions. If this happens, it can be considered one major indication of our entry into the 21st Century.

The writer could be reached at teklu.abate@gmail.com and also blogs at http://tekluabate.blogspot.no/. -

Source: http://www.zehabesha.com/inclusive-discourse-a-prelude-to-national-reconciliation

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Which Way Ethiopia: Revolution, Civil War, or National Reconciliation? By Messay Kebede, PhD

Messay Kebede, PhD

Since the death of Prime Minister Meles, the political situation of Ethiopia has entered a phase of uncertainty with no clear momentum toward stabilization. Despite predictions of the imminent collapse of the EPRDF, either under the pressure of a popular uprising or splits within its ranks, the political situation shows no sign of heightened challenge to the regime. In fact, it remains a mystery that no political upheavals of any importance occurred following the death of Meles, who was after all the center and the driving force of the whole system. On the other hand, however, notwithstanding an orderly succession, the uncertainty has not been removed and symptoms of unresolved internal conflicts transpire occasionally. Above all, the extent to which the new prime minister is really in charge being anything but assured, the vacillation of the system lingers, given that the entire government was designed to function under the leadership of a strong and unchallenged prime minister.

One thing is sure: the uncertainty cannot go on indefinitely and nothing can be done to improve the political climate and the economic conditions of the country without some reforms. This is to say that change is inevitable and that it will come sooner or later. The question is: which direction is the change likely to take? For my part, I have no desire to play the game of predictions. Instead, I want to present some possible scenarios and invite political leaders and activists who care about Ethiopia to reflect on them so as to be ready for various eventualities instead of being fixated on the outcome that they long for.

Given the amplifying state of frustration of the county, the only way of avoiding ominous developments is not only that the prime minister really exercises power, but that he uses this power to correct some of the glaring derailments of Meles, especially by easing the repressive policy adopted by him. Meles effected the reversal of democratization because he could count on the complete obedience of the repressive machine of the state. Haile Mariam does not have the same control and cannot have it without further empowering the very men who command the repressive apparatuses. In other words, failure to promote reform is for Haile Mariam to give more power to the TPLF instead of reducing it. By contrast, the political choice of easing repression, better still, of initiating reforms reduces the importance of the repressive forces and creates momentum toward the gathering of the popular support and legitimacy that Haile Mariam needs to prevail over Meles’s old clique.

The dilemma of the prime minister is thus clear enough: in order to assert himself, he has to correct Meles’s policy, but in so doing he runs the risk of antagonizing the TPLF and hence of losing his position altogether. Conversely, if he upholds the policy of his predecessor, he simply feeds on the image of a puppet of the TPLF, which image underlines his irrelevance, thereby instigating his removal. Surely, since the longer the policy of Meles continues, the more repressive the state must become, the TPLF will be better off to do the job on its own than to use the cumbersome mediation of a puppet. The dilemma shows that Haile Mariam’s best bet is to go in the direction of easing repression, which at least promises the prospect of him becoming his own man.

The huge unknown is whether Haile Mariam has the right political ambition to want to stand by himself and the political skill to outmaneuver the TPLF and other challengers. I must admit that I have no a ready answer for this question. I also confess my pessimism, even though I recognize that more time is needed before one makes a final judgment. True, I am encouraged by his open condemnation of the displacement of the Amhara settlers, but remain skeptical because of the lack of any practical follow-up to correct the injustice. Moreover, the appalling dismissal of the appeals of Eskinder Nega, Andualem Arage, and other political prisoners by the higher court did nothing to reduce my skepticism. To sum up my position, in light of the time needed for consolidation, I say that Haile Mariam still deserves the benefit of the doubt even if the performances of his government are not, so far, promising.

In case Haile Mariam remains submerged by the TPLF, the scenario of an increasingly repressive government that could only further aggrieve the Ethiopian masses presents itself. My contention is that unless the TPLF takes the rightful place of being a party among others within the coalition of the EPRDF, it cannot maintain the hegemonic role it has played so far without pushing repression to a point far exceeding that of Meles. By force of habit and because of his political shrewdness, Meles was able to rise as the unquestioned leader of the EPRDF. After successive purges of all those who could threaten him, none among the remaining leaders of the TPLF has the stature or even the capacity to command the same authority. Various competitors both within the TPLF and the EPRDF are likely to emerge with the consequence that only through increased repression can one of them prevail.

Needless to say, the pursuit and continuation of the hegemony of the TPLF can only exasperate popular frustration and multiply opposition. Though arrogance inspires the TPLF to think that repression is enough to protect its supremacy, the history of all countries teaches us that a time comes when people rise and confront what repressive them, regardless of the apparent strength of the repressive state. Ethiopia is not going to be an exception to the rule. Hence, my belief that the continuation of the hegemony of the TPLF will inevitably lead to an uprising. The burning question is: will the uprising take the form of a revolution or of an outright civil war?

All those Ethiopians who still hope that Ethiopia will be galvanized by the Arab spring have in mind an uprising leading to revolution, which would essentially consist in the overthrow of the TPLF state and the dismantling of its repressive apparatuses. This outcome appears even more likely in light of the fact that Ethiopia has already gone through a similar process in 1974. For many activists, revolution is the best prospect for Ethiopia and its people, with the hope that this time the mistakes of the 70s will not be committed and the revolution will establish a democratic state.

Here I hasten to express my reservation, which originates from the simple observation that the situation in 1974 was quite different from what Ethiopia is facing today. Indeed, if a reference to the Arab spring is of some use, I will say that what lies ahead is a development that is similar neither to Egypt nor Tunisia. The model we should refer to is that of Libya or, even more correctly, that of Syria. In other words, the likely outcome of a total uprising in Ethiopia is civil war rather than revolution.

What this means is that conflicts and violent clashes will develop, not between a dictatorial state and everybody else, but between a majority and a dictatorial state identifying with the interests of a minority ethnic group. For one of the detrimental results of the ethnicization of the Ethiopian society and the creation of ethnic regions is the clear divide between ethnic groups and the subsequent subsumption of these groups to the privileges and special treatments of local elites. In a situation of wide uprising, the point is easily reached when it becomes difficult to distinguish between the elites and the ethnic groups, which is then a recipe for ethnic confrontations, that is, for civil war.

Though I never endorse the idea that similar conditions entail similar historical outcomes, it would be foolish to think that regularities in history do not operate in some degree. Among the Arab countries that went through a political turmoil, Syria is the one that comes close to the situation of Ethiopia under the TPLF. The bloody conflict in Syria is between the Alawi minority, which controls economic and military apparatuses, and a frustrated majority that is politically and economically marginalized by a dictatorial state serving the interests of the minority. The uprising against Assad and the state failed to be revolution and turned into a civil war because of the fear of the minority that the overthrow of Assad will mean the loss of its political and economic upper hand, not to mention the fear of physical victimization. Even if many in the minority resent the dictatorial rule of Assad, they prefer to stick with him to avoid the likelihood of revengeful treatments.

No one can honestly say that Ethiopia under the TPLF does not show a deepening rift between the majority and the minority ethnic group allegedly represented by the existing regime. Doubtless, some supporters of the regime will argue that the EPRDF is a coalition of different ethnic groups so that Ethiopia is not under a minority rule. But the image of the EPRDF as a coalition of equals fools no one anymore and members of the EPRDF know perfectly well that they are clients of the TPLF, not to say hired mercenaries. The TPLF federation is a smoke screen: not only the major economic assets and the governments of ethnic regions are controlled by the TPLF, but most importantly, the repressive apparatuses, including the higher echelons of the army, are entirely dominated by officers of Tigrean origin.

One condition for a popular uprising to avoid a descent into a civil war is when the army is either paralyzed by divisions or stays neutral. This precipitates the fall of the regime and hence precludes the transformation of revolution into civil war. This was clearly the case in Egypt and Tunisia. But when the army supports the regime against the people in order to perpetuate ethnic domination, the fight is prolonged with the risk of turning into a civil war. In the case of Ethiopia, to maintain that the army will remain neutral if an uprising occurs is little credible. In the 1974 revolution, the regime was overthrown easily because the army did not support it. It was a multiethnic army and as such was not committed to the defense of any particular ethnic group. What Ethiopia has now is not so much a national as an ethnic army, which is then most likely to defend the ruling ethnic elite, thereby pushing the uprising toward a civil war.

While agreeing that the worst outcome would be the beginning of a civil war, most Ethiopians comfort themselves by believing that it is very unlikely. But who said that the worst scenario is unlikely to happen? Accordingly, what we need is realism, that is, a clear and unbiased assessment of the situation so that we can work toward making the worst scenario improbable. Stated otherwise, we should develop a policy of prevention, which is none other than the framing of a government of national reconciliation. Such a government requires crucial concessions from those who control power as well as from those who oppose them. When a country is beset with political problems that are deep and potentially liable to degenerate into armed confrontations, the solution cannot come from the organization of democratic elections. The latter require some degree of consensus and a minimum of impartial arbitration that are inexistent in ethnically polarized countries.

As shown by elections since 2005, the minimum conditions for a democratically elected government do not exist in Ethiopia and are not likely to appear any time soon. The ruling party will do everything to win, including the use of violence and fraudulent manipulations of votes; the opposition will continue to complain without any notable change. Let us admit it, in countries deeply polarized by ethnic or religious issues, where therefore the rule of the minority abiding by the verdict of the majority is not recognized, elections are just powerless to bring about political change.

This does not mean that democratic elections should be abandoned altogether. It simply means that a transitional period, during which mutual confidence, consensus, and healing can be worked out, is necessary. The purpose of a government of national reconciliation is to create the conditions for the establishment of a political system emanating from democratic elections. As a precondition for democracy, such a government is not itself ruled by democratic principles. Rather, its ruling principle is pragmatism: it takes measures from the sole perspective of reconstructing national harmony and consensus, without being disturbed by questions of principles and morality. Its main goal is the provision of incentives for political opponents to come together and establish consensus on some basic issues.

Such reconciliation is based on the premise that a civil war would benefit nobody. From this shared agreement follows the need to take decisive actions to avoid what everybody wants to avoid, the whole purpose being to reach a working mechanism assuring a win-win solution for everybody. Concessions from all competing parties are the ingredients driving the whole process. As such, the process abhors extremisms of all kinds so as to bring about the rule of moderation. Just as the ruling party agrees to share power with the opponents, so too the opponents give up all political vendetta and victimization. This is an important provision: since what prevents members of the ruling party from playing by the rule of democracy is the fear of reprisal against their person and their economic assets, offering an amnesty and a guarantee against economic dispossession is alone liable to institute confidence and reciprocity. For those who argue, in the name of justice, that crimes must be exposed and punished, my answer is that forgiveness and amnesty are morally justified if they allow us to reach the greater good of reconciliation, national unity, and peace.

Some such process of transition could be undertaken under the leadership of Prime Minister Haile Mariam. His weak political position, combined with the lack of extremism and the fact that he represents a minority ethnic group that can serve as a buffer between larger competing groups, gives him a strategic political role. It is to this go-between role that he owes his position as prime minister. To complete his mediating role, which is then his calling, he must now call upon the opposition and place himself between the EPRDF and the opposition and promote the idea of a government of national reconciliation. In so doing, he turns his strategic importance into the legitimacy of a nation-builder.

May wisdom fall on all Ethiopians!

Source: http://www.abugidainfo.com/index.php/21346/

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National Reconciliation and National Development in Ethiopia - Ghelawdewos Araia, PhD.

Ghelawdewos Araia, PhD

This essay intends to reach out the Ethiopian government and the opposition by way of suggesting to both parties so that they can and should make efforts to iron out their differences and create a political climate, conducive enough, to enable the two blocs to sit in a round table for dialogue and for the peaceful and smooth development and transformation of Ethiopia. Sometimes, we have to have the courage to say a spade a spade and realistically approach reality and accordingly foster interests that can benefit the larger society and not the political groupings only. We must recognize that reality and perception do not always correspond, and as a matter of fact objective conditions do not necessarily manifest subjective wishes and entertainments. Above all, reconciliation, negotiation, and dialogue are designed to bring together opposing or opposite forces and not birds of the same feather that flock together. It is in this spirit, thus, that I like to write this essay and invite Ethiopians to seriously consider the agenda of national reconciliation if indeed they are genuinely concerned about the national development of their country.

For the sake of convenience and simplification, I will classify the Ethiopian political forces into four categories: 1) Diaspora Enclave Opposition; 2) Diaspora and Home Patriotic Opposition; 3) Non-Committed Diaspora Ethiopia; and 4) The EPRDF-led Ethiopian Government.

Diaspora Enclave Opposition: these opposition groupings are scattered throughout the Diaspora and they are haphazardly organized under ethnic affiliations and not under national Ethiopian agenda, although a significant number of them uphold the name ‘Ethiopian’ as their banner. Most of these groups are organized in enclave-cum-neighborhood type organizations that claim to be political but in effect they are civic or social organizations that have degenerated into sub-regions in the making of their associations and even their membership in the churches. Ethiopians who come from the same nationality, speak the same language, and profess same religion have chosen to congregate in separate churches on Sundays. This group has extreme hatred to the EPRDF government, and more specifically to the ‘Woyane’ regime as per their routine cajoling, to the extent of absurdity, if not outright insanity. This group is imbued with narrow ethnic agenda that is inimical to national development, and quite obviously it could not make a positive input in the unity of Ethiopia and/or the progress Ethiopia ought to make in the 21st century. This group is led and mobilized by flag waving upscale charlatans, as I have defined them in my previous writings, and its own organization and constitution has already undermined the unity of Ethiopians abroad.

It stands to reason that a national unity of Ethiopia can be attained only when Diaspora Ethiopians, irrespective of their ethnic differences, work together as Ethiopians. What we have now are artificially superimposed ethnic enclaves of Diaspora Ethiopians that have seriously jeopardized and undermined their unity. As indicated above, if Diaspora Ethiopians who belong to the same Ethiopian Orthodox Tewhado Church pray in separate churches, how is it possible that these congregations revitalize Ethiopian unity and contribute for the development of their country? It is insanity par excellence to have two St Mary’s and two St. Gabriel’s churches of Diaspora Ethiopians in the same district and same city, as is now the case in North America. Apparently these churches are meant to accommodate same ethnic groups, and the proliferation of ethnic associations, civic organizations, radio networks, and churches are reminiscent of a primordial primate culture that clings together and despise others that are perceived as different from them.  And unless these Diaspora Ethiopians transcend their present state of mind and liberate themselves from their comfort zones (enclaves), they have no hope whatsoever to make a difference in Ethiopia’s progress.

The Diaspora Enclave Opposition lacks uniformity in outlook although it is rallied around the anti-Woyane front. Within this group, there are innocent Ethiopians (mostly youth) who do not really understand the complexity of the politics in Ethiopia; there are elderly men and women who could careless of who governs what, but by virtue of their ethnic identity they stick with their artificially fashioned community; there are sensible professionals and intellectuals (insignificant in number) who advocate an inclusive Ethiopian agenda but would not want to be ostracized by their extreme enclave comrades; and finally, there are elements who are morally retarded and psychically equipped with appalling ignorance and arrogance.

Some elements in this group are slick and have played double standards in their dealings with the seating government in Ethiopia. On the one hand, they have ostentatiously exhibited themselves in public squares, along with the innocent multitude of their brethren, in the condemnation of the ‘Woyane’; on the other, they go to Ethiopia “for a visit” and buy land, houses, and also open up businesses. Yet, some of this group has surprised their own comrades for being renegades and for joining the rank and file of the EPRDF. These hypocrites are loud enough in drumming their comrades-in-arms in the Diaspora that ‘Ethiopian wealth has been and continue to be transferred to Tigray at the expense of Ethiopians’ although deep down in their hearts they know that Bahir Dar, Awassa, and Nazreth equally, if not more, have flourished and have shown economic transformation in recent years. Even if we believe their perception to be true, what these blindfolded politicians seem to have forgotten is that Tigray is also a quintessentially Ethiopian state that must, as a matter of course, share the dividends of the Ethiopian wealth.    

Diaspora and Home Patriotic Opposition: A significant number of Ethiopians who organized themselves in the form of civic organizations in the Diaspora and political parties at home in Ethiopia, and who relentlessly and without flinching defended the unity and sovereignty of Ethiopia; struggled for the establishment of broader democracy in their country; and who made sacrifices of the Ethiopian people belong to the Diaspora and Home Patriotic Opposition. This Ethiopians are the torchbearers of freedom and heirs to the fallen heroes whose bones have littered the four corners of Ethiopia.

This group includes well-meaning Ethiopians including scholars and professionals, civic organization leaders, Ethiopian community leaders, advocacy groups and activists, political parties and coalition organizations that are not allowed to operate in Ethiopia. Of these groups, however, the oppositions that played a crucial role in Ethiopian politics are the Coalition for Unity and Democracy (CUD) during the 2005 election and the Federal Ethiopian Democratic Forum, popularly known as Medrek (forum in Amharic), in the 2010 election. Both organizations have enjoyed substantial support from Ethiopians at Home and the Diaspora, and although following the 2005 election CUD leaders were arrested, released, and then encountered fragmentation, they still had a good following. One solid group that carried the banner of CUD is Andinet, a formidable group that ultimately joined Medrek.

Following the 2010 election, the eight-party coalition Medrek has merged into a single party and vis-à-vis the current politics of Ethiopia, this was a very important move but it could have been more effective had the Coalition done it before the election. In any event, the current merger would still enable Medrek to garner more support from the Ethiopian people in the future because it would mobilize its forces as one party and not as eight splinter groupings.

The Patriotic opposition, both at home and the Diaspora, is relatively strong compared to the enclave group, but the Home opposition has countenanced major shortcomings due to lack of funding, lack of media access, and its inability to organize conferences and/or rallies due to government contravention of rules that permitted Ethiopians to organize and assemble freely. The shortcomings of the Diaspora Patriotic that belong to this group, on the other hand, are manifested in many ways. Unlike the Home front, this group enjoys broad democratic rights including staging demonstrations, freedom of speech, access to media, access to congressmen/women in the US and member of parliaments in Europe, and also its ability to raise funds easily. Despite these distinct advantages, however, this group was not able to forge a united Ethiopian organization. It is splintered into plethora of political entities, and despite repeated efforts made by some elements within this group to bring about its many organizations under one overarching organization or under one coalition party, some of the coalition in fact suffered faction degeneration and amoeba-like fission politics. On top of this debilitating problem, the intellectuals, scholars, and professionals who belong to this group were reactive for the most part and not proactive with respect to Ethiopian politics. They are unable to fashion an organic political program for Ethiopia, as other parties have done during the heyday of the Ethiopian revolution in the 1970s and 1980s.

Moreover, the Diaspora and Home Patriotic Opposition did not exhibit acumen in politics especially in its dealings with the ruling party. Instead of employing the art of politics in promoting its interests, its overall performance was tainted by principle at best and ideology at worst. Ideology indeed is a guide to action and principles cement the infrastructure of a patriotic movement, but if the opposition depends on programmatic principles only and does not include some Machiavellian astuteness in its operations and is confronted by a cunning countervailing force(s), it can crumble like a house of cards. It is because of this ideology-cum-principle yardstick that the patriotic group was unable to employ politics in all its dimensions and broad range attributes, including initiating dialogue with the ruling party, the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).

Given the reality of Ethiopian politics of the last two decades and the propensity of the foreseeable future, the Patriotic group must consider the possibility of negotiating with the EPRDF. It must shed its cocoon of principles and liberate itself from the ideological tenet and resume talks with the ruling party. The fear of “if we do so, we will entrust legitimacy to the EPRDF and confuse our members and supporters” is lame rationale compared to what the opposition could favorably garner great strides in Ethiopian politics.

The Patriotic opposition, in fact, should learn from the CUD debacle in the post-2005 election. In 2005, the CUD managed to win sizable urban votes and virtually took over Addis Ababa in its entirety, but instead of advancing its interests by entering the parliament, it refused to do so. The CUD forgot that Ethiopian politics was Third World politics (and not Western liberal democratic politics) and created unnecessary gridlock in most obsidian rigid fashion, and demanded rather an outright takeover of the government. Then, I personally wrote an article in which I argued that the CUD must enter parliament and then negotiate from strength with the incumbent party. It did not do it and the result was obvious to all of us: It lost everything and its leaders ended up in jail.

The current Patriotic opposition, thus, must not see negotiation and dialogue with the government as a sign of weakness or as gesture of legitimacy to the ruling party. Quite on the contrary, talking to the government could mean strength on the part of the opposition, and it could also, by default, promote the interest of the opposition and the Ethiopian people in the long haul.

In negotiating with the Ethiopian government, Forum should respect and acknowledge the achievements of the EPRDF while criticizing the white papers and overall political performances of the latter. It should not accept preconditions set forth by the government. However, acknowledging the achievements of the government is a sign of strength and not weakness, and to be sure I myself (a foremost critic of the current regime) have, for instance, written in admiration of the pre-election debates in my article entitled Pointers of Justice and the Ongoing Debates in Ethiopia on April 10, 2010 (please view this link, www.africanidea.org/pointers.html). Similarly, I have written another article in support of the completion of the Gilgel Gibe III Dam (see Ethiopia Must Complete the Construction of the Gilgel Gibe III Dam in www.africanidea.org/Gilgel_Gibe_111.html)  because I strongly believe that, beyond politics and above everything else, the national development of Ethiopia must come first.

Non-Committed Diaspora Ethiopia: This group represents the many silent Ethiopians in the Diaspora who do not involve themselves in Ethiopian politics in any way, shape or form. They are the quiet multitudes that seemingly enjoy the sanctuaries of college and university campuses, the offices of international development agencies, research and development institutions, and private businesses. This group is not organized under civic or political organizations, but it can broadly be divided into three groups: 1) elements, like the Enclave group, who frequent churches and traditional festivals in spite of its aloofness; 2) apathetic elements who could careless of politics in general and the current affairs of contemporary Ethiopia; 3) elements who gave up on politics completely as a result of prior adverse negative encounter, but from time to time they nonetheless entertain politics in local cafes and Ethiopian restaurants. They are like a tree that falls in the middle of the jungle and no body can hear the noise it makes. However, I do not have any quarrel with or reservation on the Non-Committed Diaspora Ethiopia. After all, politics sometimes is cruel, nasty, and disgusting, and above all Diaspora Ethiopians must earn their living in fiercely competitive environments. After depicting and recognizing the harsh reality of the Ethiopian Diaspora ecology, I am in favor of leaving the non-committed Ethiopians alone, but I am still hoping that at one point in time they too join hands with patriotic Ethiopians in the historic uplifting of their motherland.

The EPRDF-led Ethiopian Government: the EPRDF has assumed state power either by pure historical accident or by dint of political fiat; or even by carefully crafted design, or by a combination of all of the above. Logically, thus, whether we like it or not, the current seating government of Ethiopia is the EPRDF-led government. This rationale, however, does not automatically suggest that Ethiopians in the opposition must yield everything and initiate dialogue with the government and in the latter’s favor. On the contrary, it means that the government does not dictate the nature and outcome of the negotiation process; it also entails that the government must not have the upper hand in the talking arena.

First and foremost, the principle of negotiation demands and requires equal footing of the negotiating parties, if at all it is going to have a genuine fruitful result. It is in this spirit that I like to suggest to the Ethiopian government to initiate dialogue with the opposition, especially with the Diaspora and Home Patriotic Opposition. .

The recent dialogue and negotiation of the EPRDF-led Ethiopian government with the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) is not only the right track in politics; it is also a promising endeavor in fostering peace in Ethiopia. By the same token, the release of Birtukuan Medeksa from prison and the accommodation of Eritrean students at Addis Ababa University (as my good friend Professor Tecola Hagos has observed) are good gestures for reconciliation. And as my other good friend, Professor Teodros Kiros, noted in his new book, Philosophical Essays, and to which I had the honor to write a blurb, a good constitution can be mobilized “in service of humanity and produce a good moral condition of citizens.” The ultimate objective of national reconciliation and national development must be to produce good Ethiopian citizens, and not simply to foster technical development devoid of morality and justice.

If the EPRDF-led government can enter dialogue with the ONLF, it can do so with Forum or Medrek especially if it transcends selective and preferential politics. The politics of both parties could be at variance or situated at extreme sides of the continuum, but both must understand that divergent perspectives enriches a society in transition and brings meaningful and enduring transformation.

On the other hand, mono-directionality of flow of ideas, or in its worse form, “my way or the highway” attitude could be bad politics. This kind of politics could be detrimental to the very existence of a nation because the two sides could go to great lengths in destroying each other. The 2005 election, for instance, despite its manifest democratic process, exhibited mutual exclusion (if not destruction) of the EPRDF and the CUD. And it is not surprising, thus, that the ruling party and regime were haunted by paranoia long after the 2010 election ended. So, ultimately reconciliation would not only heal wounds and aggravations on both sides, but it will also preserve the sanity of the contending parties, and by default contributes to Ethiopia’s positive national development.

If the EPRDF-led government is ready to initiate dialogue and negotiation with the opposition, it must first recognize the potential input to development that the opposition could make. Secondly, the Meles government must tolerate and engage strong rivals rather than systematically avoid or isolate them. Thirdly, the government of Ethiopia must seriously rethink its ethnic politics in the administration of Ethiopia if the developmental state indeed is going to be successful. Political fragmentation in contradistinction to national development emasculates the latter’s objectives, and the EPRDF ought to transcend the current kilil (regional) politics and foster a pan-Ethiopian development without undermining the relative autonomy of the regional states. There is nothing wrong for the latter to ran their own affairs and flourish their respective cultures and languages, but it would be counterproductive for the people of one regional state (e.g. Tigrayans) not to invest in other regional states (e.g. Oromia). The EPRDF government could not bring about meaningful transformation in Ethiopia unless it first corrects the technically narrow kilil agenda.

On the other hand, if the EPRDF initiates a more inclusive politics, iron out its differences with the opposition, especially with the opposition that is eager to contribute to Ethiopia’s development, the newly restructured Ethiopian politics will dialectically reveal new opportunities and it may even deliver unexpected but promising vistas for future generations of Ethiopians.

The government, more than the opposition, has the wherewithal to change the political environment in Ethiopia, and if it is willing to do so it must invite the well-meaning patriotic Ethiopians who are willing to join hands for a better Ethiopia and for the welfare of the Ethiopian people. This kind of gesture on the part of the government, in turn, will create a positive political ambience that would have a great density of interaction, great effervescence of ideas, and a favorable atmosphere that can altogether bolster Cultural Revolution as precondition to economic development. The government must preside over a national reconciliation forum not simply with the intention of permitting democratic rights, or sharing power, but also in enabling the opposition to participate in national development at all levels. Politics and development are gregarious, and that is the bottom line that I am implying to when I call upon the opposition and the government to make a historic national reconciliation. Without the participation of the Ethiopian people, development would become ideal chimera of economic salvation, and without reconciling differences of all groups, the Ethiopian nation could not move forward. Both the opposition and the government must carefully gauge the present globalization where regional cooperation has now become a necessary ingredient to respective national developments; the recent revival of East African Common Market is one good example of paving the road to development beyond national politics. The opposition and the government also must have the decency to treat each other as opposites of the same coin in politics and as partners in the development of Ethiopia, and not as enemies.

Good luck to Ethiopia and Ethiopians!

All Rights Reserved. Copyright © IDEA Inc. 2010. Dr. Ghelawdewos Araia can be contacted for constructive and educational feedback via dr.garaia@africanidea.org      

Source: http://www.africanidea.org/national_Reconcillation.html

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